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Abstract in English 
It is well-known that co-payments in health insurance may increase social welfare by reducing 
moral hazard. Considerably less is known about the form co-payment schemes should ideally 
take. This paper investigates what co-payment rate and co-payment maximum characterize the 
optimal scheme, i.e. the scheme that achieves the highest level of social welfare, within the 
class of two-part co-payment schemes of which the second part features a zero rate. It also 
quantifies the welfare losses that correspond with sub-optimal co-payment schemes. 
The paper uses a model with optimizing households that are risk-averse, exercise price-
elastic demand and are aware of the kinks in their budget constraints. Numerical simulations 
with this model indicate that the optimal scheme combines a 80% rate with a maximum of 
about 600 euro. Sensitivity analysis shows that the maximum varies a lot with changes in basic 
parameters; the 80% value for the optimal co-payment rate is quite robust, though. The welfare 
losses that correspond to alternative co-payment schemes are generally quite small.  
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Het is bekend dat eigen betalingen in zorgverzekeringen welvaartsverhogend kunnen zijn omdat 
ze het oneigenlijk gebruik van zorgvoorzieningen beperken (moral hazard). Over de ideale 
vormgeving van eigen betalingen bestaat veel minder duidelijkheid. Dit onderzoek richt zich op 
de vormgeving van het optimale systeem van eigen betalingen binnen de groep van systemen 
die zich karakteriseren door één bijbetalingsvoet en bijbetalingsmaximum. Ook worden de 
welvaartsverliezen van niet-optimale systemen gekwantificeerd. 
Het onderzoek gebruikt een model met optimaliserende huishoudens die risico-avers zijn, 
prijsgevoelig en bewust van de vorm van hun budgetrestrictie. Numerieke simulaties met het 
model geven aan dat het optimale systeem van eigen betalingen een voet van 80% combineert 
met een maximum van 600 euro per verzekerde. Het maximum is vrij gevoelig voor keuzes van 
modelparameters; de optimale bijbetalingsvoet is echter vrij robuust. Welvaartsverliezen van 
niet-optimale systemen zijn relatief klein.  
 
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Deductibles, Co-payments 
JEL codes: D60, H21, I18   




Health insurance schemes are widespread. The unpredictable nature of medical consumption in 
a number of respects (timing, frequency, intensity, costs) makes it unthinkable that medical 
consumption would go uninsured (Arrow (1963)). Ideally, health insurance would take the form 
of payments that are only conditional on the health status of the insured (Blomqvist (1997)). 
Then, under certain conditions the first-best solution would be attainable. However, information 
on the health status of the insured is private, if it is available at all. This explains why health 
insurance typically takes the form of payments that are conditional on health expenditure. As a 
result, health insurance implies a moral hazard distortion
2 and partial insurance will generally 
yield higher welfare than full insurance (Pauly (1968)). 
Indeed, many insurance schemes use co-payment elements. Often, co-payments take the 
form of proportional schemes, schemes which adopt a co-payment rate smaller than one 
(Robinson (2002)). Deductible schemes can also be found in a number of countries, in 
particular in the private insurance sector. But there are many other forms of co-payment 
schemes. Further, the classes of proportional schemes and deductible schemes are very 
heterogeneous, in terms of maxima and in terms of services for which co-payment is required, 
for example. 
Ideally, co-payment schemes are constructed such that they strike a balance between risk 
sharing and moral hazard. Hence, it is important to know what form co-payment schemes 
should ideally take. In particular, should we have co-payment rates somewhere between zero 
and one that are independent of the neediness of the insured? Should insurance schemes apply a 
co-payment maximum beyond which no further co-payments are required? Would it be optimal 
in general to apply more than one co-payment rate? Should co-payment rates be increasing or 
decreasing in the amount of health care spending? Quite surprisingly, though, these issues have 
rarely been discussed in the literature. 
This paper characterizes the form of the optimal co-payment scheme in the class of two-part 
co-payment schemes of which the second-part co-payment rate is zero. It adopts a social 
welfare function that is derived explicitly from the utility functions of households that are risk-
averse, price-responsive and aware of the nonlinearity of their budget constraints. Because of 
the nonlinearities in the model, we are unable to derive closed-form solutions. Therefore, we 
follow two approaches. First, we simplify the model to derive results on the basis of its 
analytical solution. Second, we solve the full model numerically. The numerical results reiterate 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 1997 European Workshop on Econometrics and Health 
Economics, at the 1997 NAKE Research day and at the 2005 IIPF Conference. Thanks are due to the participants at those 
meetings, to our discussants Kris de Jaegher and Erling Holmoy. Rob Waaijers processed individual income data to and 
generated a distribution of patient income. Further, we thank Eddy van Doorslaer, Bas Jacobs and three referees for useful 
suggestions.  Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
2 Actually, there are several types of moral hazard (see Zweifel and Manning (2000) for an overview). We restrict ourselves 
to the ex post type of moral hazard, which is the type that is most discussed in the literature.   
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the results from the analytical approach, but add an indication of the numerical configuration of 
the optimal co-payment scheme, of the differences across co-payment schemes and of the 
welfare losses that correspond to sub-optimal schemes. 
There is some earlier literature on the optimal form of co-payment schemes. Arrow (1963) 
and Raviv (1979) discussed the optimality of deductibles, but neglected the price-
responsiveness of health services demand. Feldstein (1973) and Feldman and Dowd (1991) did 
account for moral hazard considerations, but assumed that the budget constraints of households 
are linear. Keeler et al. (1977) and Ellis (1986) explored health care demand in case of a 
nonlinear budget constraint. The former of these two articles touched upon the optimality of 
different co-payment schemes. Unlike our analysis however, it did not connect the social 
welfare function with the utility function from which health care demand is derived. This 
renders it difficult to assess on a consistent basis the welfare implications of different co-
payment schemes. 
The analysis by Manning and Marquis (1996) made an improvement precisely on this point. 
Their analysis of the optimal trade-off between risk pooling and moral hazard is based on 
estimates of risk aversion and the price elasticity of demand, which ultimately are based on one 
model of  household behaviour - a model that explains both the demand for health care and that 
for health insurance. However, they were unable to find plausible estimates of the optimal stop 
loss with the data they used. According to the authors, this may be due to rather imprecise 
estimates of the risk aversion of households. 
Blomqvist (1997) characterizes on a general level the form of the optimal non-linear co-
payment scheme. His analysis applies the theory of optimal taxation along the lines of Mirrlees 
(1971) to the problem of optimal health insurance without imposing any restrictions on the form 
of this scheme. Our approach is more limited as we restrict the analysis to schemes with two 
linear segments of which the second segment features a zero rate. The reason for doing so is 
that in reality co-payment schemes often feature a small number of segments only, resembling 
more our two-part scheme than Blomqvist’s continuous scheme.
3 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up a general model of health care 
demand with a kinked budget constraint. Section 3 presents a simple version of this model in 
which medical need obeys a two-spike distribution function. This version specifies a Ramsey 
rule for the optimal co-payment scheme and finds that deductibles can never be optimal. 
Section 4 adopts a more detailed version of the model using a more realistic distribution of 
medical need. An analytical solution can then no longer be obtained and we have to rely on 
numerical simulations. Section 5 describes how we have calibrated this version of the model on 
data for the Netherlands. The simulations in section 6 reiterate the result suggested by the 
Ramsey rule: within the class of co-payments schemes we consider a deductible scheme is 
 
3 It is an interesting question how to explain this phenomenon. One possible explanation may relate to administration costs. 
The costs of running a co-payment scheme may be strongly increasing in the complexity of the scheme.   
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suboptimal. We calculate that the co-payment rate that corresponds with the optimal co-
payment scheme is in the order of 80%. Section 7 explores the sensitivity of our conclusions to 
changes in an number of important parameters. Section 8 contains concluding remarks.  
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2  A model of health care consumption 
The representative patient
4 has quadratic preferences for the consumption of health care, 
denoted z, and that of other, non-medical services, denoted c. Using u to denote direct utility, 
the consumer’s direct utility function can be written as follows: 







− + − =
z m c
m z c z z c c u
ε ε ε
ε ε ε
  (2.1) 
We postulate the quadratic form for the relation between utility and medical consumption 
mainly for two reasons. First, to ensure that the demand for medical services is always finite, 
i.e. also in the case of a zero out-of-pocket price
5. Second, for analytical tractability. The 
quadratic form allows us to express expected utility as a function of the first and second 
moments of variables. This allows us to derive the optimal co-payment structure by means of 
calculation rather than stochastic simulation. 
In addition, the quadratic form has some attractive properties. It implies that the price 
elasticity of health care demand decreases if the health status of the patient worsens. Such a 
relationship is not only intuitive, it is also backed by empirical evidence (Wedig (1988)). 
Furthermore, this price elasticity is increasing in the co-payment rate, again a feature for which 
there is empirical evidence (Rosett and Huang (1973), Phelps and Newhouse (1974), Newhouse 
and the Insurance Experiment Group (1993)). 
Equation (2.1) shows that we adopt the quadratic form also for the relation between utility 
and the consumption of non-medical services, but to avoid that the marginal utility of 
non-medical products becomes non-positive, we impose that  c ε  is not “too high”
6. 
The parameter  z ε  differs between patients. This reflects patient heterogeneity in terms of 
their need of health care (the marginal utility of medical consumption equals  z m z ε ε − ). 
Underlying is a state-dependent health production function in which the value of medical care is 
a decreasing function of the health status of the patient: the worse the health of a patient, the 
more beneficial will be medical intervention. The other parameters in equation (2.1) are the 
same for all consumers. For brevity, we do not index  z ε  explicitly. 
The corresponding budget constraint is piecewise linear. We distinguish two linear pieces: 
 
 
4 Throughout the paper, we will talk about patients for simplicity, although, as we will see below, it may be the case that a 
patient decides not to consume any medical care. 
5 The standard utility function with positive marginal utility everywhere does not yield an interior solution in case the out-of-
pocket price is zero. 
6 With the budget constraint given below, it can be derived that this implies that  εc < 1/(y-p).   
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  (2.2) 
where y denotes the consumer's gross income and p denotes the health insurance premium.  1 b  
and  2 b  are co-payment rates and t is the producer price of medical services, so  t b1 and t b2  
stand for out-of-pocket prices. m  refers to the maximum of co-payments that are collected 
using rate  1 b . 
The household problem is to maximize (2.1), subject to (2.2). This problem is complicated 
due to the endogeneity of the kink in the budget constraint, i.e. the household’s choice for z 
defines the out-of-pocket price of his marginal unit of medical consumption. This makes it 
impossible to derive an analytical solution for the optimal co-payment rate and maximum 
without further simplification. 
To make any progress, the next section simplifies the model by assuming that  z ε  can take 
only two values: 
1 z ε and 
2 z ε . Effectively, this reduces the model to one with two types of 
consumers who face linear budget constraints with different slopes. Within this simplified 
setting, we are able to show that deductibles will never be part of the optimal co-payment 
scheme. 
Subsequent sections elaborate the full model numerically, assuming that consumers are 
defined by their value of  z ε , which is drawn from a mixture of three distributions (two 
lognormal distributions and a mass point at zero). All consumers then face the same nonlinear 
budget constraint. Yet, the result that deductibles are sub-optimal is also found in this version of 
the model. 
Before continuing, we make some additional comments about the interpretation of the 
model: about the resolution of uncertainty before patients make their consumption decision, 
about the role of risk sharing, about the impossibility for the health insurance industry to 
implement the first-best solution and about the absence of income heterogeneity. 
As to the first point, our model assumes that health consumption decisions are made under 
certainty. This does certainly not hold true for all health demand decisions. The relevance of 
this assumption may be restricted however for two reasons. First, uncertainty about the future 
health status can affect the price of health care only for those who have not filled their co-
payment maximum yet. Second, autocorrelation in medical shocks at the individual level 
reduces uncertainty for part of the patient population. The chronically ill are an obvious 
example. Feenberg and Skinner (1994) indicate that this type of autocorrelation is far from 
negligible. 
The second point to make is that the model is about risk sharing, not distribution. Ex post, 
i.e. after the realization of health shocks, patients differ in their health status, their demand for   
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health care, their consumption of non-medical services and their utility. The health insurance 
scheme then redistributes across patients. Ex ante however, patients are unknown whether they 
will be hit by a health shock and, if so, how intense this shock will be. Ex ante, therefore, all 
patients are equal. On an ex ante basis, thus, the insurance scheme implements risk sharing. As 
we assess the welfare implications of co-payment schemes on the basis of (ex ante) expected 
utility, it is risk sharing that, in addition to moral hazard, determines the welfare attached to 
different co-payment schemes. 
We assume that only physicians can observe the health status of patients. They share this 
information with the patient but not with the insurer. Looking at the health care demand 
equation however, the health care demand exercised by patients reveals information about their 
health status. Still, this does not mean that the information on health status is public. There are a 
number of other factors that drive health care demand and that make identification of the health 
status of the patient impossible. We have chosen not to model these other factors explicitly as 
this would add little to our analysis. 
Our model could easily be extended to one with heterogeneity across patients in terms of 
income. We have not done so in order to focus on moral hazard and risk, without having to 
bother about the issue of distribution. In an integral assessment of the effects of a typical co-
payment scheme, such an extension would probably be very useful, however. 
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3  A simplified version 
This section presents a simplified version of the model in the previous section. In particular, it 
specifies the frequency distribution for  z ε as a two-point mass distribution with mass points 
1 z ε and 
2 z ε , with 
2 z ε > 
1 z ε  > t . As we will see, the last inequality ensures that in both states 
of nature patients consume a non-zero amount of medical care ( 0 , 2 1 > z z ). The two values of 
z ε correspond with the two parts of the budget constraint. In addition, the two values deviate 
sufficiently from the value of  z ε that corresponds with the kink in the budget constraint. To 
assess the precise implications of this must wait till the next section. In addition, this section 
puts  c ε  at zero. In this case the utility function is linear in non-medical consumption and the 
income elasticity of health care demand equals zero. 
2
2
1 z z c u m z ε ε − + =   (3.1) 
Together, these assumptions imply that different co-payment rates apply to patients who are 
relatively healthy ( z ε  = 
1 z ε ) and to patients who are relatively sick ( z ε =
2 z ε ). In particular, 
the co-payment rate  1 b  applies to patients with  z ε  = 
1 z ε and  2 b  applies to patients that have 
z ε  = 
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  (3.3) 
Inserting the demand for health care into the corresponding budget constraint (3.2) gives the 
demand for non-medical products. Substitution of the two types of demand into (3.1) gives us 
the indirect utility functions that expresses the maximum attainable utility as a function of the 
relevant co-payment rate:   
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where v denotes indirect utility. 
If we now normalize the size of the population to one and use E1 and E2 to denote the 
frequency of the respective population mass points, social welfare, to be denoted V, can be 
defined as follows: 
2 2 1 1 v E v E V + =   (3.5) 
Health insurance premiums are levied in order to finance the health care subsidies. Under the 
assumption of zero profits, the expression for health insurance premiums is straightforward: 

























1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1   (3.6) 
The optimal co-payment structure now follows from the maximization of the social welfare 
function, subject to the constraint that the amount of health insurance premiums is exogenously 
given. Note that both V and p are functions of three policy instruments, namely  1 b ,  2 b  and m . 
Without loss of generality, we can let m  be a function of  1 b  and  2 b  by specifying m  as 
) /( 2 1 1 b b Rb − , with  R  an arbitrary but positive constant. This makes V and  p functions of two 
policy variables,  1 b  and  2 b . The point of maximum social welfare for a given amount of health 
insurance premiums now derives from ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 b p b p b V b V ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . We can 
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  (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) states that the two co-payment rates are positively related. If we focus upon the 
case where the least healthy group is not subject to any co-payments, i.e.  0 2 = b , expression 
(3.7) demonstrates that the optimal co-payment rate for the most healthy group of consumers is 
strictly positive and smaller than one (recall that 
2 z ε > 
1 z ε > t). Hence, a co-payment scheme 
that features a deductible and zero co-payments for expenditure beyond the deductible cannot 
be optimal. Note that the size of the two groups is irrelevant, as is the amount of health   
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insurance premiums (aggregate health insurance subsidies) for the form of the optimal co-
payment structure. 
Obviously, formula (3.7) could also have been obtained by directly applying the Ramsey 
rule for optimal commodity taxation. Sandmo (1987) shows that in case of two commodities 
that share the same producer price and that feature zero uncompensated cross-price elasticities, 
the following version of the Ramsey rule applies: 
2 2 1 1 α τ α τ =   (3.8) 
where  i τ  i=1,2 is the subsidy rate on product i, i.e. the subsidy on product i in terms of the 
corresponding consumer price and i α i=1,2 is the absolute value of the uncompensated own-
price elasticity of demand for commodity i. Formally,  ( )
i i c c i t t t / − = τ with 
i c t commodity i’s 
consumer price and t the common producer price. The co-payment rate  i b i=1,2 is defined as 
t t
i c / . Hence, equation (3.8) can also be formulated in terms of co-payment rates: 














  (3.9) 
To elaborate this, use equation (3.3) to derive the following expressions for the (absolute value 























  (3.10) 
 


















  (3.11) 
It can be easily derived that this is equivalent to expression (3.7).  
19 
4  A more realistic model 
This section elaborates the full-fledged version of the model. We proceed in three steps 
(subsections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). We replace the two-spike distribution function of the parameter 
z ε with a continuous distribution function. In contrast with the model in the previous section, 
the version in this section no longer imposes  c ε = 0 and puts 
2 b = 0  from the start. The kinked 
nature of the budget constraint is preserved. 
4.1  Optimization 
We start to replace the two-spike distribution function of the parameter  z ε with a continuous 
distribution function. An important consequence of a continuous distribution function is that the 
level of medical spending that distinguishes the population groups now becomes endogenous. 
As we will see, the kink implies a bend (and discontinuity) in the health care demand equation. 
The condition that health care demand is nonnegative produces a second type of bend. The 
description of the solution procedure can therefore be split into three parts. The first two parts 
explain how the two bends are handled. The third part is necessary to rank the two bends. We 
start to describe the first part that describes the role of the first bend. 
Part 1 optimization procedure 
The kink in the budget constraint implies that for low levels of demand, the consumer pays a 
positive out-of-pocket price for his health care consumption, whereas he pays nothing for his 
consumption of services for high levels of demand. 
 
( )
( ) t b m z m p y c
t b m z tz b p y c
1
1 1 0
≥ − − =
≤ ≤ − − =
  (4.1) 
 
The problem of the consumer is to maximize (2.1) under the constraint given by (4.1). The 
solution concept can be illustrated most clearly by considering it a three-step procedure 
(discussed also in Hausman (1985)). 
The first two steps involve the solving of two hypothetical optimization problems, whereas 
the third step compares the utility levels of the two solutions. In the first step, the budget 
constraint in (4.1) is replaced by the following hypothetical downward-sloping linear constraint: 
tz b p y c 1 − − =   (4.2)   
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Note that this constraint extrapolates the first part of budget constraint (2.2) for levels of  z  
higher than  ( ) t b m 1 . 
Optimization of (2.1) under this constraint produces the following expression for health care 
demand: 
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=   (4.3) 
where the subscript 1 indicates that (4.3) is the solution to the first hypothetical optimization 
problem. Inserting the demand for health care in (4.3) into the corresponding budget constraint 
(4.2) gives the demand for non-medical products. Substitution of the two types of demand into 
(2.1) gives the indirect utility level that corresponds to the first hypothetical optimization 
problem,  1 v . 
The second step is analogous to the first one, replacing the budget constraint by a horizontal 
line: 
m p y c − − =   (4.4) 
 
 






= 2   (4.5) 
Substitution of (4.5) and (4.4) into (2.1) gives the level of indirect utility that corresponds with 
the second hypothetical optimization problem,  2 v . 
The third step of the solution procedure involves the comparison of the indirect-utility levels 
that correspond to the two hypothetical optimization problems. The optimization problem that 
yields the highest level of utility is the solution to the consumer's problem. 
As noted above, we consider the population to be heterogeneous in the need for health care. 
In particular, we assume the value of  z ε , which measures the utility of health care services 
relative to the utility of non-medical services, to take different values for different consumers. 
As Keeler et al. (1977) have shown, the non-convexity of the budget line implies that there is a 
particular value for  z ε , say  *
z ε , that has the feature that for all  *
z z ε ε > , the consumer prefers 
the solution obtained in the second step above the solution obtained in the first step of the 
solution procedure and vice versa for  *
z z ε ε < . For  *
z z ε ε = , the consumer is indifferent 
between the two solutions (see Appendix A for the proof of this proposition and the elaboration 
of  *
z ε ).   
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This setup has an interesting implication for the health demand curve, which we define here as 
the demand for medical consumption as a function of the health care parameter  z ε . This 
demand curve is increasing in a piecewise linear way. A discontinuity occurs at  *
z z ε ε = . This 
reflects the discontinuous jump in the price and marginal utility of health care that occurs when 
the consumer reaches his co-payment maximum. Hence, there is a range of values for z which 
no patient chooses to consume. The discrete fall in the out-of-pocket price that occurs when  z ε  
passes the point  *
z ε  implies a discrete increase in health care consumption. Also interesting is 
that the right-hand side of the demand curve is steeper than the left-hand part. Intuitively, the 
consumer is more responsive to a change in his need for medical services when he faces a zero 
out-of-pocket price. 
Part 2 optimization procedure 
As said, the health care demand curve has a second bend, which is due to the non-negativeness 
of health care demand. Unlike the co-payment maximum, the non-negativeness of health care 
demand does not produce a discontinuity in the demand function however. Rather, it specifies 
another critical value for  z ε , say  * *
z ε , below which health care demand is zero. The calculation 
of  * *
z ε  proceeds exactly in the same way as that of  *
z ε . See Appendix A for further details. 
We summarize the results obtained thus far by presenting the equations for health care 
demand and indirect utility. 
( ) ( )
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 (4.7) 
where  *
z ε  and  * *
z ε  are defined in appendix A. 
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Part 3 optimization procedure 
In general,  * * *
z z ε ε > , i.e. small values of  z ε  produce zero health care demand, medium values 
produce demand with co-payments below the maximum, and large values imply a level of 
health care demand the marginal unit of which is fully paid by the insurer. However, it can be 
shown that for sufficiently low values of the co-payment maximum m, the reverse case will 
occur:  * * *
z z ε ε < . Then, one either does not consume medical services or consumes so much that 
the maximum amount of co-payments is to be paid. In this case, the critical values  *
z ε  and  * *
z ε  
are no longer relevant. Instead, a third critical value for  z ε , say  * * *
z ε , divides the demand 
function into two sections. The value for  * * *
z ε  can be derived in a similar way as the critical 
values  *
z ε  and  * *
z ε . Hence, expressions (4.6) and (4.7) apply only if  * * *
z z ε ε >  . If  * * *
z z ε ε < , 
demand and indirect utility are described by the following two equations: 
* * *
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  (4.9) 
where  * * *
z ε  is defined in appendix A. 
Appendix A also derives the critical value for the co-payment maximum, denoted  * m , that 
specifies whether * * *
z z ε ε <  (and equations (4.6) and (4.7) apply), or whether  * * *
z z ε ε >  (and 
equations (4.8) and (4.9) hold true).  
4.2  Optimal co-payment policies 
As indicated above, the continuous distribution for  z ε  is a mixture of three distributions (two 
lognormal distributions and a mass point at zero). In particular, we explore a variant of the so 
called four-part model as applied by Duan et al. (1983) for the US and Van Vliet en Van der 
Burg (1996) for the Netherlands.  
In its standard form, the four-part model describes the distribution of health care costs across 
individuals. In practice it appears that there are large numbers of people who do not consume 
health services in the period of analysis, that there are similarly large numbers of people who 
consume health services, but do not use any inpatient services, and that there are substantial 
differences between the health expenditure distributions of people who only incurred outpatient   
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costs and those of people who have also been admitted to hospital. Furthermore, both latter 
distributions can reasonably well be described using a lognormal specification. The four-part 
approach combines these findings. First, it assumes that there is a non-zero probability that 
people will have zero health care costs.  Secondly, it defines a non-zero probability that people 
who face positive costs will only consume outpatient services and a non-zero probability that 
their medical consumption includes inpatient services as well. Thirdly, it assumes that the 
health care spending of persons in groups E and I can be described by two separate lognormal 
distribution functions.  
Our approach is based upon this four-part model, but relates it to medical need rather than to 
health care expenditure. It assumes that there is a given non-zero probability 0 π of having zero 
medical need. There is a also given non-zero probability  E π  that a positive need is a draw from 
a distribution that describes need without inpatient services. Finally, there is a known non-zero 
probability  E π π − =1 1 that the need for health care is a draw from the distribution of need that 
also includes inpatient services. Obviously, it holds that   1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 0 0 = − + − + I E π π π π π . The 
non-zero medical needs of patients for medical services excluding inpatient services (denoted as 
group E) and for medical services including inpatient services (denoted as group I) are 
described by two separate lognormal distribution functions. 
The demand for health care within the two groups obeys equations (4.6) and (4.8) in the 
previous section. It will be clear that when need is zero, demand for health care services is also 
zero. The opposite is generally not true, however. As we will see, patients may decide not to 
consume medical services in case of a positive need (this happens for those who have  * *
z z ε ε ≤  
(in case equation (4.6) applies) or  * * *
z z ε ε ≤ (in case equation (4.8) applies)). This implies that 
the probability of incurring zero costs is endogenous and may exceed the exogenous probability 
of zero need,  0 π . 
Summing up, our version of the four-part model implies that there is a non-zero probability 
(1-π0)πE that ( ) ( ) 2 , ~ ln E E z N σ µ ε ,  E m m , ε ε =  and  E t t = , a non-zero probability (1-π0)πI that 
( ) ( ) 2 , ~ ln I I z N σ µ ε ,  I m m , ε ε =  and  I t t = , and a nonzero probability π0 that  z ε  equals zero 
(the values of  m ε  and t  are irrelevant in case  0 = z ε ). 
This setup implies the following expression for aggregate indirect utility, which serves as 
our measure of social welfare: 




0 − + − + − − − =
  (4.10) 
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  (4.11) 
Here, G(.) denotes the distribution function of  z ε . The three conditional expectation variables   
.) (v E  in equations (4.10) and (4.11) are derived from equations (4.7) and (4.9). 
The structure of the expression for health insurance premiums resembles that of the 
expression for indirect utility: 
I I E E p p p π π π π ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 0 − + − =
  (4.12) 
with: 
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   (4.13) 
The three conditional expectation variables  ( ) . | z E  in equations (4.12) and (4.13) can be 
derived from the expressions in equations (4.6) and (4.8).  
After substitution of the equation for health insurance premiums into the indirect utility 
function, V, we are left with an expression for social welfare that is a function of two policy 
instruments,  1 b  and m. The function is very complicated, as all critical values  *
z ε ,   * *
z ε ,  * * *
z ε  
and  * m  are endogenous, and can not be solved analytically. Hence, we resort to numerical 
simulations. In particular, we make calculations for a large number of co-payment schemes that   
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differ along two dimensions: the co-payment rate and the co-payment maximum. The co-
payment scheme that corresponds with the highest level of social welfare can then be said to be 
optimal.  
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5  Calibration of model parameters 
Before the year 2006, the Dutch public health insurance scheme was accessible only for those 
with income below a certain threshold; high incomes had to buy insurance on the private 
market. In 2006, the public insurance scheme was extended to the whole population and the 
distinction that had long characterized the Dutch market for health insurance came to an end. 
We calibrate our model on data for 2002, the year for which the most recent data are 
available. In that year, the public insurance scheme did not feature any co-payments. Absent co-
payments, it is impossible to calibrate the model. Hence, we calibrate the model on the 
population of privately insured, who traditionally have faced co-payments, particularly in the 
form of deductibles. At the end of the next section, we will say something about the 
implications of our model for the population of the former publicly insured. 
Our calibration procedure starts with a specification of the distribution function for  z ε . Van 
Vliet and Van der Burg (1996) have analyzed the properties of the distribution of health care 
expenditure of people with and without consumption of inpatient services, based on Dutch cross 
section data for 1991–1994. We use their estimates of the coefficients of variation of the 
lognormal distribution functions to obtain corresponding values for z ε . From these values, it is 
easy to derive estimates of the standard deviations σE and  σI of the normal parts themselves. 
The probability of zero need for health care services,  0 π , has been calibrated such that the 
calculation in the model of the probability of zero health expenditure matches the data. The 
value of the probability to consume inpatient health services,  I π , has been approximated by the 
number of hospital admissions per insured patient with positive health care expenditure.
7 
This leaves us with five parameters that remain to be identified:  c ε ,  E m, ε ,  I m, ε ,  E µ and 
I µ . These are calibrated simultaneously by using information on the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) for non-medical products, the level of average demand of those with and 
those without inpatient services and the insurance effect
8 corresponding to the demand of these 
two groups. The services covered are pharmaceuticals and services delivered by general 
practitioners, dentists, physiotherapists and hospitals (inpatient and outpatient services).  
Services in groups E and I are different, so prices do not coincide either. We use the estimates 
of Van Vliet (1998) to compute the insurance effects for the groups with positive health care 
expenditure, both without hospital admissions (1.23, group E) and with both outpatient and 
inpatient expenditure (1.03, group I). Note that these estimates are in line with estimates in the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al. (1993)). For the CRRA for non-medical 
products, we choose a value of 5. 
 
7 This assumes that patients who used inpatient hospital services, had only one admission per year. This is probably not too 
far off from reality.  
8  The insurance effect is defined as the ratio of the demand of a fully insured patient (with a zero co-payment maximum) 
and an uninsured patient.    
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Before we proceed, a caveat is in order. Whereas the empirical literature finds the four-part 
model to provide a fairly well description of health expenditures, we assume the four-part 
model characterizes z ε , the parameter that we interpret as a measure of the need of health care. 
Were the two variables proportional to each other, the difference in interpretation would be 
trivial. However, this is not the case for two reasons. 
First, log-normality of the distribution functions for  z ε  means that the distribution function 
for z is not completely lognormal, according to our model. Indeed, our model implies that no 
patient will choose to consume medical services at an expenditure level that is sufficiently close 
to the co-payment maximum. This means that the cumulative distribution function of medical 
expenditure features a flat trajectory around the co-payment maximum. Second, the 
proportionality factor that translates  z ε  into  z ,  z z ε ∂ ∂ / , is different for the parts of the 
distribution function for  z  below and above the co-payment maximum. 
In our application, these two issues appear not to be very relevant, though. The region of 
values of z that have frequency zero range from 2.20 to 4.42 in the case of group E for example, 
whereas average health care consumption in this group is much larger, namely 14.47. Next, the 
two proportionality factors referred to above differ less than one percent (0.40 and 0.398 
respectively). To explore this further, we will perform a sensitivity analysis in order to see the 
impact of alternative assumptions on the parameter values of the distribution functions for  z ε .  
We do not calibrate our model on estimates of the price elasticity of health care demand.  In 
our model, the price elasticity of demand is endogenous, depending among others on the value 
of  z ε (which measures the need for health care), the co-payment rate b and the maximum m. 
The unconditional average price elasticity for those who consume outpatient services only (E 
services) is − 0.39. The unconditional average price elasticity for those who consume both 
inpatient and outpatient services (I group) equals zero as in this case equation (4.8) applies (see 
section 4.1, Part 3 optimization procedure). The average of these two price elasticities equals  
−0.36, which is somewhat higher than the average estimate −0.20 of Newhouse et al. (1993). 
We did not calibrate on the income elasticity of health care demand either. This income 
elasticity is related to the CRRA for non-medical products. Having chosen a value for the latter, 
the income elasticity of health care demand follows endogenously from the model. The average 
income elasticity of health care demand is 1.35 for E-type services and 0.0 for I-type services. 
The reason for the zero income elasticity is the same as the reason for the zero price elasticity: a 
negligible part of the patients that consume inpatient services has expenditure that qualifies for 
less than the maximum of co-payments. On average, we calculate an income elasticity of 1.24. 
This value for the aggregate income elasticity is close to estimates that analyze health care 
demand on a macroeconomic level (Gerdtham et al. (1992) find an aggregate income elasticity   
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of 1.27).
9 Finally, our value for the CRRA for health care that can be derived from the 
calibration is 4.5 which deviates little from the value of 5 used by Ellis (1986).
10 
 
Table 5.1  Validation of model parameters: data 
      Privately insured      Publicly insured 
             
  Group E  Group I  Total  Group E  Group I  Total 
             
Probability of zero expenditure (%)      23.1      17.9 
Probability of positive expenditure on 
outpatient services only (%) 
     
70.7 
     
74.7 
Probability of positive expenditure on 
outpatient and inpatient services (%) 
     
6.2 
     
7.4 
Insurance effect  1.23  1.03    1.23  1.03   
CRRA, non-health products      5.0      5.0 
Income per patient (euro)      39,235      15,093 
Average demand health care services  14.5  24.9    21.3  29.7   
Producer price health care services (euro)  24.4  239.4    17.0  230.7   
Coefficient of variation health care costs  2.03  1.11    1.71  1.20   
Co-payment maximum (euro)      64.2      0.0 
Co-payment rate (%)      100      0.0 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the calibration of our model. Parameter estimates for the publicly 
insured are also included, to be discussed below. A salient aspect of the calibration is the 
skewed nature of need and demand. If a person spends on health care, there is a chance of about 
1 to 10 that this spending includes inpatient hospital services. However, the average volume of 
health care consumption of inpatient services is about double that of outpatient services and the 
price of inpatient services is about ten times as large as the price of outpatient services. 
Combined, spending on inpatient services is larger than that on outpatient services. 
Also interesting is the group of persons that do not consume any health care. About a quarter 
of the population of privately insured has zero expenditure. Of this, only 2.5% has zero medical 
need. For the most part, people that choose to have zero spending are people with positive need 
 
9 This value for the aggregate income elasticity of demand is much higher than usually found in microeconometric studies. 
However, we argue that estimates of the income elasticity found in macroeconometric studies are relevant here. Income 
elasticity estimates found in microeconometric studies apply to changes in income for an individual patient. The income 
elasticities found in macroeconometric studies apply to changes in income for the whole population of patients. The co-
payment schemes in our study differ in the amount of insurance premiums and this in the disposable income of all patients. 
In addition, we should point out that the income elasticity of health care demand and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
with respect to non-medical produts are intimately related. An income elasticity of the order of magnitude found in 
microeconometric studies would imply a value for the CRRA well below unity (0.09), which must be considered highly 
unrealistic. 
10 A number of studies (e.g. Manning and Marquis (1996)) report estimates of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. These 
data are difficult to use in our study, as their value is not unit-independent.   
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for outpatient services that is so small that the benefits from medical intervention are less than 
the costs involved. 
Table 5.2  Validation of model parameters: results 
       Privately insured       Publicly insured 
  Group E  Group I  Total  Group E  Group I  Total 
             
Probability of zero need (%)
 
    2.5      8.6 
Probability of positive need for E-type 
services (%)
 
     
89.5 
     
82.4 
Probability of positive need for I-type 
services (%)
 
     
8.0 
     
9.0 
c ε       2.42 10
− 5      7.16 10
− 5 
m ε   2.5  140.2    0.8  200.4   
µ   2.3  7.6    2.8  8.2   
σ   1.28  0.90    1.17  0.94   
Average need per patient (E(εz )/εm)  15.3  24.9    23.6  29.7   
 
To identify model parameters for formerly publicly insured patients, we assume that insurance 
effects of privately insured patients also apply to this group. Also, the value of CRRA for non-
health commodities and services is assumed to be the same for the two groups of insured. As 
Table 5.1 shows, income is considerably smaller, but average health care demand is larger. This 
is due to a larger need for medical services (Table 5.2) and a zero price (Table 5.1).  
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6  Numerical calculations 
The approach we adopt to find out which co-payment scheme is optimal in the full-fledged 
model is to search numerically for the combination of policy instruments (b, m) that maximizes 
social welfare, as defined in equation (4.10). If the value of b that corresponds with optimal co-
payment policies equals one, a deductible scheme can be said to be optimal. 
Tables 6.1 to 6.5 present calculations for a number of combinations of b and m. In 
particular, they display effects for 11 different values for b (running from 0% to 100% in steps 
of 10%) and 12 different values for m (running from euro 0 to euro 2000 in steps of euro 200 
plus infinity). Table 6.1 displays the effects upon  ) (z E , the average level of medical 
consumption. The cells with a zero co-payment rate and a non-zero co-payment maximum are 
left blank; the same applies to the cells with positive co-payment rate and zero co-payment 
maximum. In both cases, there is full insurance and the figure for (b = 0, m = 0) applies. 
 
Table 6.1  Expected volume of health care consumption of privately insured patients 
Rate (%)           Co-payment maximum (euro) 
  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000  ∞ 
                         
0  14.9                       
10    14.8  14.8  14.8  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7   
20    14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6   
30    14.5  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.4   
40    14.4  14.3  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2   
50    14.3  14.1  14.1  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0   
60    14.2  14.0  13.9  13.9  13.9  13.9  13.9  13.8  13.8  13.8   
70    14.1  13.9  13.8  13.8  13.7  13.7  13.7  13.7  13.7  13.7   
80    14.1  13.8  13.7  13.6  13.6  13.6  13.6  13.5  13.5  13.5   
90    14.0  13.7  13.6  13.5  13.5  13.4  13.4  13.4  13.4  13.4   
100    14.0  13.7  13.5  13.4  13.3  13.3  13.3  13.3  13.2  13.2  13.2 
 
As might be expected,  ) (z E  is declining in both the co-payment rate and the co-payment 
maximum. The impact of variations in the co-payment rate seems strongest. Looking at the 
corner columns and rows, the parameters interact strongly, however. Hence, it is difficult to 
calculate the exact contribution of the two parameters. Moving from full insurance (b = m  = 0) 
to zero insurance (b = 100, m =∞
11) reduces average medical consumption by about 11.5 
percent. This effect is not trivial, although smaller than expected. It is clearly far below the 
 
11 Approximated by 10
8 euro. 
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almost 50% reduction of expenditures that can be calculated on the basis of the Health 
Insurance Expreiment (Zweifel and Manning (2000)).  
Table 6.2 gives the effects upon ) (c E , the average level of non-medical consumption. Here 
also, the qualitative effects are intuitive. The higher the rate or the maximum of co-payments, 
the higher is average non-medical consumption. The reason is that any reduction in average 
health care consumption allows for a cut in health insurance premiums. 
On the whole, the effects are pretty small. Going from full insurance to no insurance would 
raise average non-medical consumption with a meagre 0.2%. The reason is clear: the effects on 
average medical consumption are small and the spending on non-medical consumption dwarfs 
that on medical consumption. 
Table 6.2  Expected volume of non-medical consumption of privately insured patients 
Rate (%)           Co-payment maximum (euro) 
  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000  ∞ 
                         
0  32,076                       
10    32,081  32,081  32,081  32,081  32,081  32,082  32,082  32,082  32,082  32,082   
20    32,085  32,086  32,086  32,086  32,086  32,086  32,087  32,087  32,087  32,087   
30    32,088  32,090  32,090  32,091  32,091  32,091  32,091  32,091  32,092  32,092   
40    32,091  32,093  32,094  32,095  32,095  32,095  32,096  32,096  32,096  32,096   
50    32,093  32,096  32,098  32,098  32,099  32,099  32,100  32,100  32,100  32,101   
60    32,095  32,099  32,101  32,102  32,103  32,103  32,104  32,104  32,104  32,105   
70    32,096  32,102  32,104  32,105  32,106  32,107  32,107  32,108  32,108  32,109   
80    32,097  32,104  32,107  32,108  32,110  32,110  32,111  32,111  32,112  32,112   
90    32,098  32,106  32,109  32,111  32,113  32,114  32,114  32,115  32,115  32,116   
100    32,099  32,107  32,112  32,114  32,115  32,117  32,117  32,118  32,119  32,119  32,129 
 
The impact of insurance can be highlighted by computing the implicit transfers from patients in 
the E group (patients that consume only outpatient services) to those in the I group (patients that 
consume also inpatient services). These implicit transfers are defined as the premium actually 
paid minus the hypothetical amount that patients in the E group would pay if the I group would 
be excluded from health insurance. The implicit transfers are at maximum in case of full 
insurance. The amount of 536 euro per E patient corresponds to 6,168 euro per patient in the I 
group (89.4% of the population falls into the E group, 9% into the I group, 2.6% has zero need). 
The latter amount is about 15% of the average patient income, 39,235 euro, which is sizeable. 
In general, implicit transfers are decreasing, both in terms of the co-payment rate and in 
terms of the co-payment maximum. Obviously, downsizing insurance decreases implicit 
transfers. For small values of the co-payment rate, implicit transfers are an increasing function 
of the co-payment rate, however. This has to do with the differential price elasticity of the 
demand for inpatient and outpatient care. An increase of the co-payment rate does not have a   
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big effect on medical consumption of I-type services, whereas patients in the I group share in 
the fall in insurance premiums that is due to lower medical consumption by patients in the E 
group. Hence, implicit transfers from the E group to the I group increase upon an increase in co-
payment rates. 
In the limit case (b=100%, m= ∞)  implicit transfers are zero. Interestingly, with a co-
payment maximum as high as 2000 euro, the implicit transfer per patient of E-type services is 
still 414 euro. This again reflects that the consumption of I-type services is very price-inelastic. 
Table 6.3  Average implicit income transfers from E to I patients per patient in group E 
Rate (%)           Co-payment maximum (euro) 
  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000  ∞ 
                         
0  536                       
10    524  513  506  500  496  493  491  490  488  487   
20    526  512  500  490  482  475  469  464  460  456   
30    528  514  500  488  477  467  458  451  444  438   
40    529  515  501  488  476  464  453  444  435  427   
50    530  517  503  489  476  463  451  440  430  421   
60    530  518  504  490  477  464  451  439  428  417   
70    531  519  506  492  478  464  451  439  426  415   
80    531  520  507  493  479  465  452  439  426  414   
90    531  521  508  494  480  466  453  439  426  414   
100    532  521  509  495  482  468  454  440  427  414  0 
 
Table 6.4  Social welfare of privately insured patients 
Rate(%)             Co-payment maximum (euro) 
  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000  ∞ 
                         
0  965.9                       
10    975.5  975.3  974.8  974.3  973.8  973.3  972.9  972.5  972.1  971.8   
20    982.6  982.8  981.9  980.7  979.4  978.0  976.7  975.5  974.2  973.1   
30    987.6  988.8  987.8  986.1  984.1  982.0  979.8  977.6  975.4  973.3   
40    990.9  993.4  992.5  990.6  988.0  985.2  982.2  979.2  976.0  972.9   
50    992.8  996.5  996.0  994.0  991.1  987.7  984.0  980.1  976.2  972.1   
60    993.6  998.5  998.4  996.3  993.2  989.3  985.1  980.5  975.8  970.9   
70    993.7  999.4  999.7  997.6  994.3  990.2  985.4  980.3  974.8  969.2   
80    993.1  999.4  1000.0  998.0  994.6  990.1  985.0  979.3  973.3  966.9   
90    992.1  998.7  999.5  997.6  994.0  989.4  983.9  977.7  971.1  964.2   
100    990.8  997.4  998.3  996.4  992.7  987.8  982.0  975.5  968.4  960.9  0.0 
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Table 6.4 displays social welfare. For reasons of presentation only, values in the table are linear 
transformations of computed welfare. It turns out that the (b, m) combination of  (80%, 600 
euro) yields the highest level of social welfare (displayed boldly in Table 6.4). That the optimal 
co-payment rate and co-payment maximum have intermediate values, reflects the trade-off 
between the welfare loss from the moral hazard distortion and the welfare gain from risk 
reduction that health insurance brings about.  ) , ( m b  combinations to the upper left of the 
optimum (denoted as  ) ˆ , ˆ ( m b ) imply lower social welfare as they feature too much moral hazard. 
Similarly,  ) , ( m b  combinations to the lower right of  ) ˆ , ˆ ( m b  imply lower social welfare as they 
correspond with too little risk sharing. 
As a tool to produce an accurate estimate of the optimal co-payment scheme, the search 
procedure that produced table 6.4 is too global: we have to resort to a finer grid search to find 
the globally optimal co-payment scheme. Therefore, we declined the step sizes of b and m  to 
2% and 100 euro respectively and arrived at (b = 78%, m =530) as the optimal co-payment 
scheme. The corresponding level of social welfare equals 1,000.2. A further reduction of the 
step size of b  and m  produced negligible changes (differences in expected utility less than 10
−3 
%). A further refinement of the search procedure is therefore not necessary. 
Full insurance dominates no insurance. This result differs strongly with that in Manning and 
Marquis (1996). That analysis found the case without any insurance to dominate the case of full 
insurance. The income elasticities used in the two studies may offer an explanation. Manning 
and Marquis (1996) use an income elasticity of 0.22, which is considerable smaller than ours 
and would imply a much lower CRRA for non-medical products than we have used. In addition, 
that analysis assumes the price elasticity of medical consumption to be a constant, whereas ours 
decreases with a deterioration of the health status of the patient. Moreover, in general one may 
expect large differences for extreme cases like full insurance and no insurance, since calculation 
of the welfare levels of these cases relies on an extrapolation of parameter values far beyond the 
range of data that were used to estimate them. 
For a meaningful comparison of welfare effects, we resort to the corresponding 
compensating variations. These are defined as follows. Formally, if we express social welfare as 
a function of the rate and maximum of co-payments and the level of patient income, say 
) , , ( y m b V , we calculate the compensating variation for full insurance,  FI y ~ , from the condition 
) , ˆ , ˆ ( ) ~ , 0 , 0 ( y m b V y y V FI = + . Similarly, we calculate the compensating variation for zero 
insurance,  ZI y ~ , from  ) , ˆ , ˆ ( ) ~ , 40000 %, 100 ( y m b V y y V ZI = + .
12 The generalization to the 
definition of compensating variation as a function of the rate and maximum that define a typical 
co-payment scheme is obvious then. 
 
12  If m exceeds 40000 euro per person, the condition  1 ) ~ ( < − + p y y ZI c ε is violated (see also footnote 5). Hence, we cannot 
calculate a compensating variation for the case without any insurance. The reason is that utility is quadratic in income. 
Hence, there is an upper limit to the utility gain that a compensating variation of income can achieve,. If the differential utility 
with the optimum ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( m b ) is too large (as it is for the case of zero insurance), there is no value for the compensating 
variation that would bridge the utility differential.   
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Table 6.5 repeats Table 6.4, but now displaying compensating variations rather than social 
welfare levels. Full insurance is seen to imply a utility loss of only 18 euro per person, 
equivalent to an income drop of less than 0.1 percent. The compensating amount in case of zero 
insurance amounts to 419 euro per patient. This corresponds to 1.1% of average income per 
patient. This is extremely little. 
As noted earlier, until January 1 2006 there were two insurance schemes in the Netherlands, 
a set of private insurance schemes and a public insurance scheme. Using the values in Table 5.1 
and 5.2, it is possible to evaluate the optimal insurance scheme for publicly insured patients. 
The optimum turns out to be (68%, 320 euro), which is rather close to the outcome for the 
privately insured (78%, 530 euro). On average, we arrive at an optimum of (72%, 380 euro) for 
all insured patients. 
Table 6.5  Compensating variations for different (b,m) combinations, privately insured  (euro) 
Rate (%)           Co-payment maximum (euro) 
  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000  40000 
                         
0  18.23                       
10    13.13  13.23  13.48  13.76  14.04  14.29  14.52  14.73  14.91  15.07   
20    9.32  9.22  9.70  10.35  11.05  11.76  12.47  13.14  13.79  14.41   
30    6.63  5.99  6.53  7.43  8.51  9.65  10.83  12.01  13.17  14.32   
40    4.87  3.55  4.00  5.05  6.41  7.92  9.52  11.17  12.84  14.51   
50    3.85  1.86  2.12  3.23  4.79  6.60  8.57  10.64  12.77  14.93   
60    3.40  0.82  0.86  1.98  3.67  5.72  8.00  10.44  12.98  15.60   
70    3.39  0.34  0.18  1.26  3.05  5.28  7.82  10.58  13.50  16.53   
80    3.70  0.33  0.00  1.05  2.90  5.28  8.04  11.08  14.33  17.73   
90    4.23  0.72  0.27  1.29  3.20  5.71  8.65  11.93  15.47  19.21   
100    4.93  1.42  0.92  1.94  3.90  6.53  9.64  13.14  16.94  20.99  418.76 
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7  Sensitivity analysis 
How robust are our results with respect to perturbations in important parameters? Three of them 
relate directly to the moral hazard and risk reduction components of expected utility. These are 
z ε ,  m ε and the CRRA.  The last parameter is directly linked to the parameter c ε . We vary the 
values of  m ε , the CRRA and the variance of ln( z ε ) between 25% and 175% of their 
benchmark values, in steps of 25%. Changes in the variance of ln( z ε ) are equivalent to changes 
in the coefficient of variation of the distribution of  z ε itself. We adopt step sizes in the co-
payment rate of 10% and 200 euro in the co-payment maximum, like in Table 6.4. Tables 7.1, 
7.2 and 7.3 contain the results: the optimal co-payment rate and the co-payment maximum. The 
last row displays compensating variations relating to the optimum in each column and the 
corresponding situation of full insurance. Note that in Tables 7.1 and 7.3 we vary the 
parameters for both the E and I group simultaneously. Finally, in Table 7.4 we report the results 
for changes in average patient income. Here we have chosen a different range in order not to 
violate the restriction on income εc (y-p) < 1 (see also note 5). 
Table 7.1  Optimal (b,m) combinations and compensating income variations for different values of the 
standard deviation of ln( z ε ) 
         Standard deviation of ln( z ε )  
E group  0.32  0.64  0.96  1.28 (base)  1.60  1.92  2.24 
               
I group  0.23  0.45  0.68  0.90 (base)  1.12  1.34  1.57 
               
Co-payment rate (%)  90%  80%  80%  80%  70%  70%  60% 
Maximum (euro)  800  800  600  600  400  200  200 
Compensating variation  24.56  22.04  20.00  18.23  15.86  12.67  9.94 
 
Table 7.2  Optimal (b,m) combinations and compensating income variations for different values of the 
CRRA 
         CRRA 
  1.25  2.50  3.75  5.00  6.25  7.50  8.75 
               
Co-payment rate (%)  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80% 
Maximum (euro)  800  600  600  600  400  400  400 
Compensating variation  39.96  28.25  22.11  18.23  15.56  13.86  12.55 
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Table 7.3  Optimal (b,m) combinations and compensating income variations for different values of  m ε , 
both E and I group 
 
       m ε  
               
E group  0.62  1.25  1.87  2.49 (base)  3.11  3.74  4.36 
I group  35.04  70.08  105.12  140.16 (base)  175.20  210.24  245.28 
Co-payment rate (%)  70%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80% 
Maximum (euro)  600  600  600  600  600  400  400 
Compensating variation  62.08  35.41  24.31  18.23  14.39  11.88  10.11 
 
Table 7.4  Optimal (b,m) combinations and compensating income variations for different values of average 
patient income 
      Average income per patient (euro) 
  19618  23541  27465  31388  35312  39235(base)  43159 
               
Co-payment rate (%)  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80% 
Maximum (euro)  800  800  600  600  600  600  400 
Compensating variation  48.80  43.52  37.85  31.87  25.38  18.23  10.82 
 
Given the wide range in parameter values, the optimal co-payment rate is fairly stable. Its value 
varies between 70% and 90%. This implies that our conclusion that b < 100% is quite robust. 
The optimal value of m is more sensitive, in particular with respect to downward changes in 
model parameters. When differences in health status between individuals decline, risk aversion 
is less important and the optimal co-payment maximum and compensating income amount 
increase. The same happens when the CRRA is reduced, as was to be expected. Table 7.2 
demonstrates that the impact of the CRRA parameter upon the optimal co-payment maximum is 
fairly large: the optimal co-payment maximum increases from 400 to 800 euro when CRRA 
drops from a value of 5 to a value of 1.25. Simulations of still lower values of the CRRA (not 
shown here) indicate even higher values for the co-payment maximum. The high sensitivity of 
the optimal co-payment maximum to the value of the coefficient of risk aversion was also noted 
by Manning and Marquis (1996). Finally, a fall in the value of  m ε  yields a lower price 
elasticity of health care demand and thus increases moral hazard. This also leads to higher 
values for the optimal co-payment maximum. The impact of this parameter is far less large than 
that of the parameter that measures risk aversion. Table 7.4 indicates that changes in average 
income have a small effect on the optimal co-payment rate and a large effect on the optimal co-
payment maximum.  
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8  Concluding remarks 
The most important results from our analysis are the following: i) within the class of co-
payment systems studied, a deductible scheme is suboptimal ii) the optimal co-payment scheme 
features a co-payment rate of about 80% and iii) the optimal co-payment scheme features a co-
payment maximum of about 600 euro. The robustness of these three results is quite different. 
The sub-optimality of deductible schemes is quite robust. As shown, it holds true both in a 
stylized world in which it derives from the Ramsey rule of optimal commodity taxation and in a 
world that includes much more realism. However, the other two results depend on the numerical 
setting that we adopted and are therefore less general. Although the optimal co-payment rate is 
roughly stable at about 80%, the sensitivity analysis that we performed made clear that the 
results regarding to co-payment maximum rely rather heavily on the degree of risk aversion, 
which is a parameter of which estimates have large confidence intervals. 
Three factors warn against immediate application of our results by policymakers. First, our 
calculations did not include administrative costs, which can be different for deductible schemes 
than for alternative co-payment systems. Second, preferences for policymakers need not 
coincide with those of households. In particular, we think the risk aversion of policymakers may 
be higher than that of households. Thirdly, a caveat is that we did not explore the consequences 
of other types of utility functions. This underlines that our results cannot be more than 
indicative of the answers that a more comprehensive analysis would produce.   
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Appendix A  Critical values for the health care need  
      parameter 
The proof of the proposition that there is a particular value for  z ε ,  *
z ε  that has the feature that  
i) for  *
z z ε ε >  ( *
z z ε ε < ), the consumer prefers the solution obtained in the second (first) step 
above the solution obtained in the first (second) step of the solution procedure and ii) for 
*
z z ε ε = , the consumer is indifferent between the two solutions, is as follows. First, note that 
1 v and  2 v , the indirect utilities corresponding to the two hypothetical optimization problems, 
can be viewed as functions of  z ε . To stress this relationship, denote these functions as  ( ) z v ε 1  
and  ( ) z v ε 2 . Next, define the difference between the two functions,  ( ) z v ε 2 1− , as 
( ) ( ) z z v v ε ε 2 1 − . Given  the specification of the utility function in (2.1) and the optimal 
solutions in (4.7) and (4.9), the function  ( ) z v ε 2 1−  is quadratic in  z ε . Solving  ( ) 0 2 1 = − z v ε  
yields two solutions for  z ε , of which one is positive.
 Call this solution  *
z ε . It can be derived 
that  ( ) z v ε 2 1−  is decreasing in  z ε for all  z ε > 0. Hence.  ( ) 0 2 1 > − z v ε  for 0 <  *
z z ε ε <  and 
( ) 0 2 1 < − z v ε  for  *
z z ε ε > . 
The general expression for the equation  ( ) 0 2 1 = − z v ε  reads as follows: 
0 2 = + + c z b z a ν ε ν ε ν   (A.1) 
with 
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The procedure we adopt to derive expressions for  * *
z ε and  * * *
z ε is similar to the one we use 
to derive  *
z ε . The derivation of the expression for  *
z ε  uses the indirect utility functions 
corresponding to the two hypothetical optimization problems mentioned in the text ( 1 v and  2 v , 
or v for  * *
z z ε ε ≤ and vfor  * * *
z z z ε ε ε ≤ ≤  in equation (4.7) respectively). The derivation of   
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* *
z ε combines  1 v  with the indirect utility function that corresponds with the corner solution 
0 = z ε . Similarly, the derivation of  * * *
z ε combines  2 v with the indirect utility function that 
relates to the corner solution  0 = z ε . The results are as follows: 

















ε   (A.5) 
As mentioned in the text. the sign of  * * *
z z ε ε − determines whether the health care demand 
function consists of three or two pieces. The sign of  * * *
z z ε ε − in turn is determined by the 
relation between the co-payment maximumm  , and a critical value for this co-payment 
maximum, say  * m . If  * m m > , health care demand is described by (4.6); if  * m m < , equation 
(4.8) describes health care demand. The expression for  * m  follows from elaborating the 
condition  * * *
z z ε ε =  ( * * *
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Appendix B  Moments of the lognormal distribution 
A stochastic variable x is said to be log-normally distributed if its logarithm, ln x, has a normal 
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where F(.) denotes the standard normal distribution function. 







1 exp ) ( ) ( σ µ dx x xg x E   (B.3) 
Using this expression we calculate the (conditional) moments of g. 
The conditional n-th moment equals: 
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The corresponding conditional expectation per capita of the group to which this expectation 
applies, is slightly different: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) 2
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It is the definition in (B.5) that is relevant for our model.    
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From (B.4) and (B.5), it follows that the conditional absolute expectation and the conditional 
expectation per capita equal 
[ ] ) (
ln ln
































  (B.6) 
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And the second-order moments equal 
[ ]
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The unconditional variance can be obtained from (B.3) and (B.4): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 exp ) ( 1 exp 2 exp
2 exp ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2
− = − +
= + − = − = ∫
∞
σ σ σ µ
σ µ σ
x E
dx x g x x E x E x   (B.10) 
 
From equation (B.6), the following expression for the coefficient of variation (the ratio of 
standard deviation and expected value) of a log-normally distributed variable can be derived: 
( ) 1 ) exp( 2 − = σ v C   (B.11) 
So, the coefficient of variation of the lognormal distribution of a variable x only depends on the 
variance of ln x.   
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